Testimonies of chilean exile: beetween public protest and the working through of trauma. by Peris Blanes, Jaume
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
TESTIMONIES OF CHILEAN EXILE: 
BETWEEN PUBLIC PROTEST  
AND THE WORKING THROUGH OF TRAUMA  
JAUME PERIS BLANES 
 
 
 
Public Protest and the Reconstruction of the Struggles 
The extreme violence unleashed by the Chilean military regime 
following the coup d’etat in 1973, which soon materialized into a 
repressive system of concentration camps and torture, was perfectly in 
harmony with a series of structural reforms in Chilean society promoting 
the realization of a truly capitalist revolution.1 This revolutionary 
transformation, which inscribed Chilean society into the most orthodox 
ideology of the neo-liberal program, required the dismantling of the social 
fabric that had at the beginning of the decade made possible the rise to 
power of the Unidad Popular (UP) and its replacement with a completely 
different regime of social structuration and political participation. 
The repressive dynamic of the military government was consistently 
linked to the legislative, economic and social transformations that shook 
Chile from 1973, producing a political body whose objective and 
fundamental effect was to generate a system for the production of 
subjectivities apposite to market society. In fact, the repressive 
technologies imposed by the military revealed a conception of subjectivity 
as a substance malleable by means of physical torture. In contrast to what 
the militaristic ideology had always proposed, the fundamental objective 
of torture was not so much to extort information from the detainees as it 
was to eradicate established political identities and the social ties that 
sustained them. In that sense, the concentrationary system and the massive 
implementation of torture that followed the coup of ’73 should not be 
                                                                           
1 According to the apt expression of Moulian. 
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thought of as eruptions or excesses in the exercise of power, but rather as 
structural elements in the project of social transformation that set the 
government of the Military Junta in motion.  
Perhaps for that reason, and from the first instance, the testimonies of 
the survivors in exile proposed themselves as a space in which the 
commitments and modes of experience that had been sustained in the 
popular movement could be, in some way, safeguarded. That would be 
carried out by describing the spaces—the concentration and torture 
camps—especially designed to do away with them. In this way, the 
survivors who chose to narrate their experience in the camps both publicly 
denounced the scope of military repression and at the same time attempted 
to establish foundations for the continuity, in the near future, of the 
popular movement the military was attempting to extirpate. 
This explains why many of the testimonies contained prologues by 
prominent figures in the Unidad Popular movement, figures such as Luis 
Corvalán, Volodia Teitelboim and Gladys Marín.2 In the words of the 
prologue writers it is clear that, from their perspective, from the moment 
that the military regime had blocked up all the means of political 
participation hitherto available, to bear witness to what had happened in 
the camps constituted a new form of social struggle in perfect continuity 
with the popular project of the UP. In that sense, in the leftist imaginary, 
the survivors in exile who offered their testimony became combatants of a 
new kind, key elements in the reconstruction of the struggles that had been 
cut down by the violence of the coup. 
From the beginning, some of the camp survivors’ testimonies became 
materials in circulation, in which many exiles found a space of 
recognition, and that built the foundations for a certain symbolic cohesion 
in the face of the geographic dispersal of exile. Some testimonies 
circulated in mimeographed or carbon copies among the clandestine 
militants who still remained in the Chilean interior. Alejandro Witker, 
author of Prisión en Chile, donated the profits of his testimony to the 
clandestine leadership of his party in the interior of the country, with the 
hope of contributing to the reconstruction of their struggles. 
The first group of testimonial texts produced in exile, therefore, 
maintained a close relationship with the broad movement of international 
protest that followed the coup of ’73, and from different spaces attempted 
to pressure Western governments to check the development of the military 
regime. The figure of the concentration camp survivor was practically 
                                                                           
2 All figures linked to the Chilean Communist Party, and who carried out an 
intense project of protest in exile. 
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omnipresent in the commissions, events and interventions3 that marked 
this movement of protest, and many of the urgent publications denouncing 
the atrocious dynamic unleashed by the Military Junta would incorporate, 
already in the first few months, testimonies of those who had spent time in 
the concentration and torture camps, those who bore a singular knowledge, 
based on their own experiences of what was taking place there.4 
Conscious of the import that their image and their word was receiving 
in the protest movements and in an attempt to reconstruct the struggles that 
had been uprooted by the coup, the survivors’ testimonies brought to 
representation some of the central elements of the popular movement, 
political identities and experiences that the system of camps tried to 
eradicate. This was carried out with the objective of safeguarding them, 
albeit symbolically, against the military hurricane and of serving as a 
reference and an anchor for the political reconstruction that necessarily 
was to come after the fall the Pinochet regime.  
Thus, many of the survivors used the stories of their lives in the camps 
as a metaphor of the social relations that the military regime had wiped 
out, and in many of their narratives they constructed a antithetical 
imaginary in which the military mode of behaviour was exactly the 
opposite of how the prisoners related to each other. Representing those 
elements that the repressive dynamic strove to smash—political identities, 
formations of the social network, collective experience—they emphasized 
the way that, despite the military violence, all these elements survived. 
Many of the testimonies would extend to all levels of representation, 
thus, a process of metaphorization of the concept of community that the 
thrust of the popular movement had sustained, a community that would 
not let itself be lost. On the one hand the testimonies promulgated the 
experience of the camps as immanently collective, constructing individual 
experience as a hypostasis of a community experience; on the other, they 
                                                                           
3 Among the most important, at the First International Conference of Solidarity 
with Chile, held in December of 1973 in Helsinki, was the proposed creation of the 
International Investigative Commission of the Crimes of the Chilean Military 
Junta. Testimonies by numerous concentration camp survivors were heard in 
subsequent sessions. 
4 As was the case, for example, of the very early publications Testimonios de 
Chile, edited in Buenos Aires by the Argentine intellectuals Noé Jitrik and Silva 
Bermann; Testimonio: Chile, septiembre 1973 (VVAA: 1973); Sergio Villegas, 
Chile, el estadio, los crímines de la Junta Militar (1974); Carlos Cerdá, Chile: la 
traición de los generals (1974); Chile: le dossier noir (VVAA: 1974); or Judy 
White, ed. Chile’s Days of Terror, Eyewitness Accounts of the Military Coup 
(1974). Only a few months after the coup, all these had incorporated numerous 
survivors’ testimonies. 
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showed the perseverance of collective commitments in the prisoners’ 
relationships. 
That process of metaphorization of the lost community was not limited 
to the presentation of situations characterized by the mobilization of 
collective commitments; in many cases it animated the style by which the 
narratives organized their raw materials, the different voices and 
discourses that were called up in them, and the very narrative structures in 
which the testimonies took shape. Against the docile, malleable and de-
politicized subjectivities that the camp system sought to produce, the 
survivors enunciated their experience of the horror from out of the 
regimen of political experience that the military regime tried to eradicate, 
with the declared objective of providing the near future with the elements 
of reference for a re-articulation of the struggles and the social network 
that the military government was obdurately trying to destroy.  
The fact is that all this effort to safeguard the political identities and 
experiences of the popular movement would have little to say in the 
process of Chilean re-democratization, and would remain for the 
transitional ideology a rather sinister remnant of a past about which no one 
wanted to know anything. This should not surprise us, since if the 
Transition was effective in anything it was precisely in its capacity to drain 
away the antithetical imaginary that had sustained the struggles from the 
beginning of the seventies, an imaginary that in the testimonies of the 
exiled survivors would at best remain frozen, like a photograph of another 
time, and which in the imaginary of the democratic Transition would 
gradually acquire a sepia tone of memories that, from afar, appear to arrive 
from a foreign world. 
Further, for many agents of the Transition, the testimonies of the 
survivors constituted a lacerating presence, in the context of the historical 
project that changed Chile and of the violence that failed to do away with 
it, because they presented themselves as a remnant of another time 
offering nothing in the way of direction for the political future; for these 
agents the testimonies would lack influence and relevance to the 
consensual project that would structure the social re-democratization and 
reorganization of the nineties. The survivors’ testimonies would be, thus, 
relegated to a archive that, with few exceptions, no one wanted be 
responsible for. Like sordid family secrets, they would be relegated to a 
forgetting that would present itself, furthermore, as the condition of the 
spectacularized success of the transitional process, and thus were 
converted into an inert material, incapable of shedding light on the social 
space of which they had dreamed of being, a few years earlier, the 
referents. 
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Limit Experience and the Fragmentation of the Telling 
When I was forced to abandon my country at the end of 1974 I found 
myself shaken. My mind hadn’t been able to grasp the significance of what 
had happened.... Then something unexpected happened: I re-read the pages 
and the initial memory was blurry, and only gradually did my memory 
begin returning. At times it was as if the text had been written by someone 
else. Strange how the mind blacks out those memories that make it difficult 
to function… (Sergio Bitar 13; emphasis added)5 
 
Already published in Chile during the final years of the military 
dictatorship, Bitar’s very belated testimony, Isla 10, explicitly posed a 
question of the relation the surviving subject maintained with the traumatic 
event undergone inside the camps: what role could testimonial writing 
have in the symbolic elaboration of this relationship and, as such, in a 
certain process of reconstitution of subjectivity years after the technologies 
of violence wielded by the military regime had made of that subjectivity 
its principal field of application.  
From the beginning Bitar’s text signaled that the experience of the 
camps was something which, at first, he was not able to integrate into his 
own biography. It had to do with an element the survivor had expelled 
from the representation of his experience, since he did not find the form by 
which to introduce it. In this way, the experience of the camps was 
situated in a regimen of exception or discontinuity with respect to Bitar’s 
other experiences, with the result being that it was extremely difficult for 
the subject to construct a narrative in which to include it: as if the 
experience of the concentration camp had produced a discontinuity in the 
subject’s temporality, a void in which he didn’t recognize himself as such. 
That problem would become one of the recurrent reflective elements in 
the Chilean testimonial narrative that, albeit with different forms and 
intensities, would not cease to address this question. In many of the texts 
written by the survivors, testimony was presented as a space that would 
facilitate the reintroduction of the traumatic incident into the temporality 
of the subject or, what amounts to the same, would construct for the 
survivor a subjective position from which to represent himself in the 
traumatic event. To carry that out would require, as is logical, an 
enormous illocutionary energy, and the construction in many cases of an 
                                                                           
5 One of the principal leaders of the Unidad Popular political movement, Bitar was 
the Minister of Mining in the Allende Government and, many years later, Minister 
of Education in the Lagos administration (2000-2006). 
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extremely complex rhetorical structure in order to sustain that speaking 
position. 
What is interesting to note is that the construction of this enunciative 
position capable of carrying out this process—which is nothing other than 
the position of the witness—could not be achieved without violence or 
contradictions: “At times it was as if the text had been written by someone 
else,” as Bitar says. And this paradoxical linkage of the narrated 
experience to the “I” embodied in the text would acquire in each of the 
testimonies a different form, in some extreme cases—those, perhaps, more 
formally elaborated—becoming veritable ontological paradoxes, as we 
shall see. 
In fact, testimonial texts would not only propose their intervention with 
respect to the projects of historical transformation for which the authors 
had been spokespersons. Although that was the element that would give 
political meaning to the texts, permitting them to circulate in the spaces I 
have described and to be apposite to the authors’ intents, it is also clear 
that all the work of writing would be traversed by an element that seemed 
to emerge in a disruptive form in the face of the explicitly political 
orientation of their discourse. In fact, the presence in testimonial texts of 
what we could call a phantasmatic remainder of the traumatic event would 
seem to erode the solidity of the political wager, piercing the roundness of 
their enunciations and undermining from within the apparent power of 
their link to concrete historical projects.  
That elusive but omnipresent presence, difficult to locate but 
nonetheless permeating the testimonies from beginning to end, is the 
element that makes these texts unique and differentiates them in large 
measure from other political texts. In fact, beyond the representations of 
the social relationships they evidence, which is to say their ideological 
claims and their self-representation as important works in the struggle of 
exile, what truly solidifies the political nature of the survivors’ testimonies 
is the presence of that traumatic remainder that, even without desiring it, is 
revealed in them. 
Although each survivor confronted this traumatic nucleus differently, 
each would need to construct a perspective from which to write so that the 
experience could be inscribed in the discourse in some way. This was the 
fundamental challenge that the testimonial enunciation confronted: how to 
put into discourse the traumatic experience that had taken place in the 
interior of the camp dynamic? With what linguistic register should the 
horror be confronted? By means of what narrative strategies could an 
experience that had caused a fundamental rupture in the biography of the 
subject be ordered? With what discursive procedures could a space be 
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created such that the dislocating power of the traumatic event could 
emerge in the telling of it without breaking the narrative completely apart? 
In short, how to inscribe in the narration the processes of de-
subjectification that had taken place in the survivor while maintaining the 
subjective position that allowed him to speak? 
We know that the idea of trauma maintains an intimate relationship 
with the temporality of subjectivity: it concerns an experience that the 
subject perceives as strange to himself, as foreign to his biography, as an 
accident that provokes a discontinuity in subjective time. The traumatic 
event is expelled from the narrative framework by which the subject 
organizes his own story and therefore the temporality—not chronological, 
but experiential—through which the subject situates himself in the world 
and produces an experience of it. The trauma would be, thus, what comes 
to establish a hiatus in subjective temporality, given that it concerns an 
event that threatens to produce a dissolution of the “I” and therefore 
cannot be inscribed in the logic of the subject’s desire.6 
That being said, the testimonies of the survivors pose a fundamental 
question which they tried to answer in their own texts: is there a way in 
which the subject can incorporate the traumatic event into his own history? 
In his now classic book on testimonies of the Nazi death camps, Lawrence 
Langer to responded to this question: 
 
Testimony is a form of remembering ... straining against what we call 
disruptive memory …an effort to reconstruct a semblance of continuity in 
a life that began as, and now resumes what we would consider, a normal 
existence. “Cotemporality” becomes the controlling principle of these 
testimonies, as wintnesses struggle with the impossible task of making 
their recollections of the camp experience coalesce with the rest of their 
lives. (2-3) 
 
More than that, the testimonies accomplish—sometimes in an obvious 
way, sometimes less so—an elaboration of the traumatic event, converting 
it into the centre of a narrative, while at the same time situating it as the 
motor of the discourse, and, further result of its disaggregating effect, as 
the principal threat around which the narrative attempts to construct itself. 
If, as almost all the survivors posit in their texts, the concentration camp 
dynamic implied a demolition of the subjective order, an experience of 
radical dislocation in which the subject, to a greater or lesser extent, 
arrived at a nadir, the testimony can be thought of as the process through 
                                                                           
6 An interesting approach to this problem from a psychoanalytic perspective can be 
found in Roca. 
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which the survivor could claim his position as witness: through it he 
would reconstruct his possibility of addressing the other and in that way 
the possibility of constructing a position of witness for his own 
experience, a position from which it, also, could be narrated. 
In a general overview of the survivors’ testimonies written during the 
first years of the military regime, what most stands out is the feeble 
narrativity by which almost all of the texts sustained themselves.7 
Nonetheless, this feeble narrativity should not be read as an aesthetic 
failure, but instead as an indication of the way in which the survivors tried 
to articulate the experience of the concentration camps in the discourse. In 
fact, the majority of these testimonies lack an element that would unify the 
different experiences narrated in them and that would inscribe them in a 
causal continuity that would make intelligible the relation between the 
various narrative elements: in short, what the majority lack is a strong 
subject capable of suturing with his presence the disaggregation of the 
diverse elements of the experience at work in the narratives. 
In my view, this raises two fundamental questions: in the first place, 
the fact that the concentration camp experience presents itself to the 
survivors as radically fragmented; and in the second place, that the way in 
which the experience is elaborated in narrative discourse would not find, 
in the majority of cases, any element by which to wholly integrate those 
disaggregated elements into a unified narration. 
This has to do, of course, with a general consideration, but one 
sufficiently recurring so as to make us think that one of the fundamentals 
of testimony can be found in this narrative weakness, since in some 
manner it encodes the relation between the fragmented experience, the 
narration in which it is included and the subjectivity-guarantor of that 
narration, and its potential suture. 
This is to say, testimonial enunciation puts into play a series of 
enormously complex and subtle relationships between the “I” that 
speaks—and claims for himself the status of surviving witness—and the 
subject that suffered the concentrationary experience, thus converting 
itself into the space of a radical and involuntary interior transformation. As 
I will analyze, the impossible adequation of these relationships would in 
                                                                           
7 This is something that is not specifically highlighted by critics, with the exception 
of the attentive focus of Ariel Dorfman: “The functions that we have examined 
here [those of the testimony] and the concrete mode of their coming to fruition, 
implicitly bear an almost inevitable tendency toward narrative fragmentation. 
Memory, accusation, the panoramic sense, the truth of the others which succeeds 
the tragedy, the multiplicity of those who inflict it, all of this contains an 
irresistible grain of dispersion” (188). 
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large part mark the rhetorical strategies the survivors employed to narrate 
what was experienced in the camps. 
In the attempt to express the experience that took place in the spaces 
the military set up, both in order to break constituted social identities and 
to construct subjectivities apposite to the new neo-liberal society, and 
having been the subject in which the fundamental spaces of this radical 
dislocation spoke, it should not surprise us that he who took charge of the 
discourse would do so in a wavering, exploratory form, without being able 
to construct a structure capable of making the language with which he 
gave his account intelligible, homogenous and narratively continuous.8 
In this sense, the representation of torture scenes—where the logic of 
the violence permeating the entire concentrationary dynamic was carried 
to the limit—was the space concentrating most of the contradictions and 
problems of representation the survivors confronted in testifying. The 
forms in which in the texts construct the torture scenes varies greatly, of 
course, and depends on the choice each survivor made in facing the 
representation. But it needs be said that for that same reason the form of 
their construction and the place they occupy in the global structure of each 
account of the camps condenses the ethic of enunciation by which each 
testimony is sustained. They concentrate as a problematic knot the 
multitude of representational choices that each survivor had to confront in 
order to allude to those events presenting the most traumatic nucleus of 
their experience or, in some cases, to experiences which, even though the 
survivor was not directly the target, could not be completely shaken. And 
that was precisely the question: did a “targeted” subject exist in the 
experience of torture? And, if so, did he coincide with the principal subject 
of the discourse, with he who had decided to speak, and stood surety for 
the narrated world? 
                                                                           
8 Contrary to what some literary criticism seems to think, it would be in the voids 
and the empty spaces which the assumed incapacity generated in the testimonies, 
in the abrupt leaps and discontinuities of its narrative configuration, where not only 
the particularity of these texts would be encoded, but also their extraordinary 
political value in as much as they gave rise, in Sonia Mattalia’s phrase, to a “new 
ethics of enunciation,” linked, precisely, to the dislocations that produced the 
phantasmatic remains of the traumatic event that took shelter in the testimonial 
enunciation. 
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Representing Reification: The Impropriety  
of One’s Own Body 
In Prisión en Chile, for example, the vantage Alejandro Witker 
constructs in order to approach torture in the camps is at once both very 
distanced and very effective in its analytic intention. By means of an 
impersonalization characteristic of some academic writing, the speaking 
subject constructs a supremely dense mask distancing himself in the 
extreme from the processes he will describe, while at the same time he 
presents an extraordinarily charged moral judgment concerning what is 
going to describe. The text manifests, therefore, a vigorous intention to 
disconnect personal experience from the possibility of articulating a 
judgment on the problem of the camps, in order that the latter will not be 
seen to be contaminated by the phantasms of the survivor’s own 
experience: 
 
The bodily torture varied: electric shock was applied to the sexual organs, 
to the anus or rectum, to the chest and over the heart; for the women, to 
both breasts, to their eyes, to their noses. In these places they set up a strap, 
connected to an electric device, such that turning it on provoked exhausting 
nervous crises, vomiting, fainting, and even heart attacks, costing 
numerous prisoners their lives. Bodies were usually struck with rubber 
whips, metal chains and sticks, and of course by the boots of the torturers. 
Some prisoners were strung up. Sometimes they were suspended from a 
beam by their feet, with their heads to the floor, or else by their hands 
tightly bound. Regardless of the method, the torture was carried out for 
several days, even weeks, and it was varied with being thrown violently 
against the walls. Burnings were also an often used procedure; in one 
variation they would burn women’s breasts with lit cigarettes. (Witker 36) 
 
What we have here is practically a typology of punishments, an 
anthropologically informed description of the possible forms of torture. Of 
course, nothing of the subjective experience surfaces in this analysis, and 
none of the textual markers link the speaking subject with the dynamics of 
what he describes. On the contrary, it would seem that the viewpoint from 
which Witker explains the torture is completely disconnected from any 
experiential anchor. Moreover, the text’s syntax excludes the subject’s 
participation in the narrated actions (“the bodily torture varied”; “in these 
places they set up”; “bodies were usually struck”; “the torture was carried 
out”), and speaks instead of the implication of bodies in processes in a 
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more or less abstract way, disconnecting them from any personal 
experience.9 
But this gesture at once rhetorical and ethical also permits an 
objectification—before that evaluative void, the reader finds himself in 
need of constructing a moral position from which to pronounce a judgment 
on the dynamic so impersonally described—an objectification of the 
experience that, even though it has marked his life, the survivor chooses 
not to represent as his own. This process of analytical objectification of the 
experience has no doubt a close relationship to the survivor’s position of 
exteriority with respect to the experience itself, an experience that in 
specific moments seems, according to Bitar, to belong to “someone else.” 
And further, a close relation to the need of the survivor to establish a 
position from which to gaze upon the shattering experience of the torture, 
as if his subjectivity were not implicated. 
The construction of this objectifying distance is modulated in diverse 
forms in the different testimonies of the survivors, each governed by 
differing, particular motives. However, in many there is a displacement of 
the subject’s own body and of the subjectivity of the detainee, establishing 
a subtle and shattering game of distantiation between the subject and the 
enunciative instance foregrounding the survivor’s difficulties of thinking 
and imagining himself in the camp and, above all, in the extreme scene of 
the torture. 
In this sense, some of the most powerful texts manifest an important 
tendency to explore the possible formal solutions to the representation of 
the process of reification that was manifest in the concentrationary logic 
and especially in the torture sessions. The greater part of the contradictions 
of these testimonies are crystallized in the necessarily conflicted form by 
which the texts formally resolve the relation between the speaking subject 
and the process of reification that had taken place in him. 
In Rolando Carrasco’s Prigué: prisionero de guerra en Chile, for 
example, the process of reification takes the textual form of a progressive 
grammatical objectification of the prisoners. Early in the text, in order to 
describe the process of reification to which they were subjected, the 
enunciation situates the prisoners as subjects of the processes being 
described:10 “we formed a bunch of hanging sausages.” But in the scene in 
                                                                           
9 In his testimony, Manuel Cabieses indicated that “to depersonalize our situation 
not only alleviates, but allows it to be better understood” (67). 
10 “The muscles of our legs stiffen, wet clothes stick to our hides, bags under our 
eyes and our tongues baked from so much smoking. We wait eight hours immobile 
in our detention, when they order us to get up and join together at one of the side 
walls. Single-file line. They tie our hands to the napes of our necks and with the 
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which Carrasco describes the beginning of the torture sessions the subjects 
are displaced in the spoken syntax by an object function: 
 
They touch my body looking for arms. It’s the third or fourth search in all 
that has happened since I was detained ten hours ago. Face to the wall I 
don’t see the faces of the trio but I do distinguish small drops of blood 
coagulating on the wall and trailing painstakingly toward the floor. The 
little red balls leave behind an opaque trail as they dry. 
“What’s your name?” 
I give my name. 
“What party do you belong to?” 
“To the Communist Party.” 
The fist that traveled in the direction of my face stops just at an eye 
without touching me. 
“So you are a Communist? And aren’t you ashamed to confess it?” 
“No.” 
The fist returns and twists my head on impact. Multiplied it falls on the 
neck, back, ears. A knee comes from behind and hits the testicles. I clench 
my jaw and close my hands in a desperate contraction. (29, emphasis 
added) 
 
The syntactic displacement extends in this way to all the strata of 
representation, transforming the principles upon which the figuration of 
the text is sustained. In fact, the grammatical objectification highlights a 
process of excavating all of the elements that could give organic coherence 
to the representation of the subject and his corporality. The body of the 
detainee enters the text as a mere sum of disintegrated fragments, 
impossible to unify in one single instance. These corporeal fragments, 
disarticulated from the bodies and the intentionalities of the subjects 
appear as mere objects (fist, head, neck, back), isolated from any 
relationship of continuity between them. By the same token, the blood 
appears disconnected from its violent causes, discursively constructed as a 
mere visual surface (“The little red balls leave behind an opaque trail as 
they dry”). 
The text manifests, then, the important work of distantiation between 
the subjectivity of the speaker and the elements of the scene he describes. 
What is paradoxical is that these elements are precisely his body, his 
                                                                           
same rope tie us all together. We have our wrists tied behind our heads. The tip of 
my chin reaches the back of the person in front of me and the face of the person 
behind me presses on my back. Stuck together like that, its not easy to move 
forward, despite the shoving of the guards. We formed a bunch of hanging 
sausages, of vertical pieces, groping our way up the ladder, encouraged by kicks 
and shouts” (Carrasco 29, emphasis added). 
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intentions and the aggression of the torturers; however, not one “I” offers 
itself as a point of reorganization for all the disintegrated elements in the 
scene, which become, thus, totally disconnected from the subjectivity 
authorizing the discourse. It is through this process of distantiation that 
Carrasco discursively implements a certain elaboration of the process of 
reification which runs up against the horizon of representation: placing, in 
the heart of the scene, any relation of meaning between the parts of the 
body and the speaking subject outside the scene. 
In the sentence that ends the selected fragment, however, the jaws and 
the hands of the detainee appear to be linked to a subjectivity that survives 
this process, despite all; they appear to refer to verbs implying a 
intentional act on the part of the subject who carries them out, and can, 
indeed, be identified with the subject who speaks. This oscillation between 
subjectification and objectification is a recurring theme in Carrasco’s text, 
as it is in other testimonies, and marks, if I am not mistaken, one of the 
great obstacles for those confronting testimonial enunciation. 
In fact, the representation of bodily pain is one of the challenges that 
these texts must tackle, and probably the one that presents major problems 
to the survivors at the time of constructing an enunciative structure 
capable of doing so. Perhaps because the extreme pain of the torture 
sessions threatened to destroy the organic unity of the body and, in that 
way, to erase that which sustains the survivor’s subjective identity.11 
Some of the testimonies take up this problem as their principal 
exploration. In the case of Carmen Rojas’ moving text, Recuerdos de una 
mirista, the conflictive relationship between the body and subjectivity 
during the confinement is insistently thematized, underlining a 
representation of the experience of the uncontrollability of the body to 
which almost all of the survivors testify. In the case of Rojas, this is linked 
to the “loss of the sensation of space and equilibrium,” that is, to the 
subjective dislocation resulting from the blocking off of the senses 
produced in the detainee by the technology of repression. The disturbing 
representation of the disconnection between the subjective will and the 
functioning of her body is the antechamber of a phantasmagorical 
representation that took the detainees’ bodies as the principal object.12 In 
                                                                           
11 In her now classic study of the structure of torture, Elaine Scarry, referring to the 
collapse of the prisoner’s world, maintains that “the absence of pain is a presence 
of world; the presence of pain is the absence of world” (37). 
12 “It seemed that my body had been divided up and spread out all over the place, 
beyond my skin, my arms and my legs.... Meanwhile, I had the feeling that the 
compact entity that our bodies made moved in waves like gelatin and I didn’t know 
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that representation, the force of the pain made the organic unity of the 
body unintelligible and, with the disappearance of the unified image of the 
body, the subjectivity dependent upon the body’s cohesion also fell into 
fragments. 
Nonetheless, the fragmentation of subjectivity effected by the 
dislocation of the body image manifests itself in the enunciated, but 
without permeating the enunciative voice. In linguistic terms, what takes 
place in the text is a radical distantiation between the subject of the 
enunciation and the subject of the enunciated, perfectly correspondent with 
the temporal distance that is implied in the title of the testimony, 
Recuerdos de una mirista.13 Such distantiation doesn’t imply that the one 
didn’t recognize the other, but rather precisely enabled the subject to speak 
of her own disarticulation in the past, once the restorative powers of time 
had worked their “reconstruction.” This distance established, Rojas would 
represent her own demolition by constructing a strong subject of 
enunciation capable of fashioning extraordinarily condensed images in 
order to recount her own subjective demolition: 
 
I received the first charge with a shriek. My entire body shook abruptly. 
My head cracked and my ankles hurt so much, as if apart from the bones, 
they were striking each one of the nerves and veins of my legs.... Time was 
another enemy: I awaited, endlessly prolonged in terror, the brief intervals 
between each charge, tensing my body and twisting my muscles in an 
attempt to make an impossible escape that was dying in the solitary space 
of my body. And then each charge would come more ferocious and painful 
than the previous.... I was drowning. My body in spasms on its own.... 
Afterward, spent, they threw me in the cell. (28; 31; emphasis added). 
 
Beyond the extraordinary construction of images the text realizes, it can be 
seen to be permeated, as are many other survivor testimonies, by the 
figurative process of progressive isolation of the body with respect to the 
subjectivity that is lodged there (“My body spasms on its own”; “spent”). 
This should not surprise us, since the process was without doubt one of the 
principal aims of the concentrationary technology, overturned in the 
progressive erasure of all that was subjective in the individual and in his 
transformation into a mere corporeal existence disconnected from identity 
or will.14 
                                                                           
exactly where my body ended and other bodies began” (Rojas 18, emphasis 
added). 
13 A mirista is a supporter of the MIR, Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria. 
14 This is one of the arguments developed by Agamben in his studies of the 
concentration camps and the production of bare life (1999, 2000). 
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Albert Sucasas has posited that the concentration camp experience is 
centered on the experience of the body, “but of a body that can no longer 
be considered, simply, as one’s own. Paradoxical experience: equally, 
strangeness of a body that had ceased to belong to anyone and 
radicalization of the identification with one’s body; the concentration 
camp inmate lives, unsurpassable horizon of his existence, the aporia of 
the impropriety of his own body” (198).  
In this sense, the dynamics of the camp would have as object and effect 
the destruction of subjectivity and identity: “without identity, the 
concentration camp inmate is converted into pure somatic existence, into 
naked flesh” (Sucasas 198). Survivors would attempt to textualize that 
process in their testimonies through very different rhetorical strategies, but 
always highlighting the search for a means capable of accounting for this 
process of de-subjectification—that is, of the progressive erasure of the 
subjective through the demolition of the relations of sensation with one’s 
own body. 
The valuable testimony of Luz Arce15 represents in an even more 
complex manner the process of dissociation between the subjectivity and 
materiality of the body that took place in her torture sessions: 
 
Without saying anything they threw me on a mattress and raped me. 
Various men: at first I tried to resist, I tried to keep them from taking off 
my clothes, kicked blindly. Then on the floor, with the weight of those 
individuals on top of me, their fetid breath hurt me inside as if they had 
broken me, pain in my entire body, I am crying, I have no strength left, I 
only perceive that I am “something” thrown there that was “being” used. 
That I resist is like a stimulus. That I remain still, if I mentally go to other 
places seems to be less of an incentive for them, I am a disjointed dummy, 
two men hold my legs while they touch me, I am gagged by a greasy rag 
that insists on going down my throat inducing waves of nausea, first one, 
then another and another…I am one single and great nausea that grows, it 
encompasses all of me and I vomit, I can’t expel the vomit that smashes 
against the gag and returns inside, I gag, vomit again, I can’t breathe, 
something hot drowns me and suffocates me. I begin to learn to die, they 
are still on top of me, I feel my body shake spasmodically. (56, emphasis 
added) 
                                                                           
15 Published in the first few years of the Transition to democracy, El infierno 
unleashed a polemic without precedent, given that Luz Arce had passed from being 
a functionary in the Socialist Party to actively collaborating—after having suffered 
ghastly tortures—with the repressive organs of the dictatorship. Mi verdad, the 
testimony published not long after by Marcia Alejandra Merino, ex-mirista and 
also an active collaborator for many years, would inflame even more the debate 
about accusation, responsibility, and amnesty. 
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This fragment is articulated upon a displacement in the temporal economy 
of representation, and especially in the relationship between the time of the 
enunciation and that of the event narrated. If in the first moment (in 
accordance with the global logic of Arce’s testimony) the scene is 
constructed in the past, and thus the time of the speaking subject and the 
time of dynamic described do not coincide (“they threw me on a mattress 
and raped me”), that relationship would change abruptly once Arce 
reflects upon her place in the logic of the torture, and would give way to 
being syntactically constructed in the present (“I only perceive that I am 
‘something’ thrown there that was ‘being’ used”). 
What is most significant is not that this slide is effected in absence of 
all transition or narrative believability, but that a highly problematic 
structure is engendered in which the moment of enunciation temporally 
and spatially coincides with the event being described. In creating this 
fiction of simultaneity between enunciation and event, the speaking 
subject coincides point by point with she who suffered the process of 
dissolution. Only from this fiction of simultaneity is it possible to 
enunciate something like “I only perceive that I am ‘something’ thrown 
there that was ‘being’ used,” and later, “I am a disjointed dummy” and “I 
am one single and great nausea,” in which the speaking subject literally 
confirms her own disappearance as such. 
The curious thing is that although the text implicitly postulates this 
identification between the speaking subject and she who was demolished, 
both possibilities are logically excluded. That is to say, how is it that in the 
precise moment in which the subject dissolves there emerges a position of 
speaking, there where nothing ought to remain?; from whence appears this 
“I” situated in an empty space—which the text itself decrees as such—in 
order to verify, precisely, her non-existence? Albeit with very different 
intensities and formal solutions, this profoundly paradoxical gesture can be 
seen in various survivor testimonies, and thus solidifies, I believe, 
something fundamental in the constitution of testimonial enunciation. In 
any case, it concerns a paradoxical position of enunciation—an impossible 
voice, as I have called it elsewhere16—that reveals the difficulty of 
integrating the traumatic nucleus of torture into the order of representation. 
                                                                           
16 In La imposible voz (2005), I have tried to reflect extensively about this type of 
testimonial enunciation, by means of a detailed study of Hernán Valdés’s 
testimony, some of whose arguments I briefly re-elaborate in what follows. 
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The Impossible Position of the Witness 
Hernán Valdés’s Tejas Verdes: Diario de un campo de concentracion 
en Chile, published not long after the coup, carried this enunciative 
construction to the limit.17 The testimony carries out a kind of transcription 
of the momentary thoughts and sensations of Valdés, constructing his 
voice in a rigorous present that would not be substituted throughout the 
course of the narration by any other tense.18 If we think of the enunciative 
process as the construction of a subjective position, the permanent, 
hypertrophic present tense of Valdés’s account makes events coincide with 
the emergence of the subjectivity that was able to recount those events, 
thus producing a series of problems, as we will see, bearing on the fact that 
not every situation—and even less in extreme conditions—allows a 
subject to situate himself in a position of speaking about what happened. 
As the narrative advances, the narrator begins to describe the recurrent 
impossibility of thinking himself a subject, linking it to the emergence of a 
corporeality that, in its uncontrollable materiality, undermines every type 
of subjective identification.19 If we understand the concentration camp, in 
its most extreme forms, “[to be] the name of the mechanism whose 
performance consists in seizing the subject in the refuge of his identity, 
producing as the final remainder an irreducible residual or remnant of this 
operation, the body” (Sucasas 198), then the fundamental problem that 
                                                                           
17 First published in Barcelona in 1974, and in Chile for the first time in 1996. 
18 To that end, the enunciative voice differs from the voice of the traditional diary 
format, since in Valdés’s testimony the displacement of the narrator as effect of the 
experiences narrated is continuous, and does not manifest any rupture 
whatsoever—in contrast with the diary format, where the temporal distance of one 
day mediates each displacement of the narrator’s position. Like a camera trying to 
capture an instant in the moment it occurs, the testimony utilizes a present tense 
syntax (“I see”) contrary to the structure of the past tense (“Today I saw”) typically 
found in the pages of a diary. This generates the illusion of a perpetual fluidity of 
the subject, whose enunciation coincides with the events narrated, without any 
mediating temporal distance. 
19 “I have one sole preoccupation: to shit, because I can hardly hold it and I am 
sure that I will do it in the interrogation. I beg them to let me go.... The morning 
smell of eucalyptus even prevails over the stench of the ditch of shit. I steady 
myself and squat down. The shit flows instantly, all at once, the colour of Meaux 
mustard, to perfection. A soldier keeps watch with his gun, very close by. I don’t 
have anything with which to clean myself, but what does it matter now. I scrape 
off the remains with eucalyptus leaves. We return. At a trot. The sun blinds me, the 
light and the speed prevent me from thinking about myself in any other manner 
than as a mere object of nature” (Valdés 112, emphasis added). 
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Valdés confronts could be formulated in the following way: from what 
position could he narrate his own subjective de-structuration and the 
emergence of this excremental remnant that is the body, if the subjectivity 
that could hypothetically testify to that process had been totally annulled? 
 
I don’t know how to say that I am trembling without making it seem like a 
rhetorical figure. My knees, shoulders, chest, the muscles of my neck and 
nape shake independently, each with their own distinct contractions. I 
know that my back aches, but the pain doesn’t make me suffer.... The pain 
in my back comes in certain instants, as if just now I were beginning to 
receive kicks, one by one, in a methodical manner, with a precise 
chronology. I am sorry for my body. This body is going to be tortured, it’s 
an idiot. And even still, that’s the way it is, there is no rational way to 
avoid it. I understand the necessity of this hood: I will not be a person, I 
will not have expressions. I will only be a body, a bulk, they will come to 
an arrangement only with it. (1996 115, emphasis added). 
 
This fragment thematizes the emergence of anguish in its most 
fundamental and irreparable form: the fragmented vision of one’s own 
body, resulting, moreover, from the presence of that real materiality which 
is impossible to represent without recourse to the trope (“I don’t know 
how to say that I am trembling without making it seem like a rhetorical 
figure”), and from the dislocation of the unitary image of the body, 
imaginary support of subjectivity. There appears, thus, a fragmented 
representation of the body in which each element is a discursive entity 
distinct from the others and where the only thing that unites the different 
corporeal elements is the figure of contortion, the coming out of their 
places of the diverse bodily fragments. 
This anguish of fragmentation produces in the speaking subject a 
process of de-solidification of the body: “I am sorry for my body. This 
body is going to be tortured, it’s an idiot.” But in the sentence that closes 
the fragment this scission appears to change form, now that the subject of 
the enunciation, distanced from his own body, referring to it in third-
person singular, identifies himself with it at the same time by means of the 
verb “to be”: “I will only be a body, a bulk, they will come to an 
arrangement only with it.” This implies, as I understand it, the will to 
construct a means that, from the impossible position of this scission, 
would allow speech, that is to say, from the non-place of articulation 
between the body and subjectivity.20 
                                                                           
20 Or, in other words, the non-place of articulation between the living being and the 
speaking being, in accordance with the succinct definition given by Agamben 
(2000) of the enunciative position of the survivor-witness of the camps.  
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It’s as if they cut me in two. For fractions of a second I lose consciousness. 
I recover because I am at the point of asphyxiating. Someone rubs 
violently over my heart. But I, as soon as I heard it spoken, feel it in my 
mouth, leaking out of me. I begin to breathe out of my mouth, at a hellish 
speed. I can’t find the air. My chest leaps. My ribs are like a grating that 
crushes me. There is nothing left of me except this hysterical greediness of 
my chest for swallowing air. (1996 117, emphasis added) 
 
The logic the text constructs in order to relate the process of radical de-
subjectification that took place in the torture sessions is, in this passage, 
taken to the extreme, its paradoxical nature to a limit point. In order to 
recount that process, it is necessary, in effect, that a strong subjectivity 
take charge of the discourse, which is in open contradiction with the 
fiction sustaining the entire rhetorical apparatus of the text: namely, that 
the speaking subject and the subject whose avatars are represented are the 
same, and, further, that what happened to him was meticulously 
simultaneous with the very act of speaking. 
This fundamental contradiction produces deep paradoxes such as 
“there is nothing left of me”: while “there is nothing left” emphasizes an 
idea of a radical evacuation of subjectivity, to enunciate “of me” it is 
nonetheless necessary that something abide; something has to remain as 
residual in that process of radical de-ontologicization in order that from 
there one might speak, and refer that lack of being to an “I” which is 
explicitly negated in the “nothing left.” 
In other words, if “this hysterical greediness of my chest for 
swallowing air” was the only remaining remnant of the subject, from 
where, on the very inside of the event, could it have enunciated that 
permanence of an excremental residue divested of subjectivity? Only from 
the non-place of articulation between the body and subjectivity, that is, in 
the space that arose between the bodily materiality that survived as 
remnant and that voice that appeared anchored to a disappeared 
subjectivity, as object of its own enunciations, although without a 
determinable position in them. Another remnant remained, therefore, of 
that radical de-ontologicization—not only the body that survived as 
opaque materiality, but the position of enunciation the subject occupied—a 
remnant that made possible the enunciation itself, because without it, it 
would not be possible to speak from any place. 
The paradox that sustains the position of the witness is grounded in this 
impossible loop; an impossible position, since it permits a subject to speak 
from the place of his own demolition, in the very moment in which it was 
produced. Agamben has highlighted a process of this nature in proposing 
that “to bear witness is to place oneself in one’s own language in the 
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position of those who have lost it, to establish oneself in a living language 
as if it were dead, or in a dead language as if it were living” (2002 161). If 
we understand a dead language to be that one in which is impossible to 
assign the subject position, the logical consequence of this comparison is 
that the witness assumes a subject position in a space in which his 
possibility is negated: and this, exactly, is what sustains the enunciative 
position in Tejas Verdes as I have analyzed it. 
Moreover, this impossible position that Valdés’s text facilitates by 
narrating the concentrationary experience must be conceived, I believe, 
from the paradigm of fantasy: the fantasy of the subject who can dissociate 
completely and, in this way, observe and narrate coherently his own 
demolition in the moment in which it was produced. This fantasy 
facilitates the impossible gaze upon that which sustains the text, and that 
which, therefore, determines the representation of the experience that takes 
place in it. 
Curiously, psychoanalysis teaches us that fantasy is one of the 
principal modes by which we subjects elaborate the elements that provoke 
anxiety in us, displacing them in scenes of imaginary configuration, 
oftentimes in a paradoxical way: in such scenes the subject is at the same 
time principal actor and spectator.21 Psychoanalysis teaches us as well that 
in the aforementioned dialectic between the traumatic event, the subject’s 
temporality, and his biography, one of the ways that the traumatic event 
can be included in the interior of the account by which the subject 
narrativizes his existence is precisely through the means of fantasy.22 This 
is to say, if the trauma is that which supposes a discontinuity in the 
temporality of the subject and a break in the narration which sustains the 
subjective position, one way the subject can reintegrate the trauma into his 
biography is through fantasies that elaborate in some form, by means of 
scenes or narrations, these traumatic elements. 
In this way, it seems that the construction of an enunciative position 
negating itself as possibility is the means by which, for Valdés, something 
of the traumatic nucleus is enunciable in the account. That he is able to 
                                                                           
21 In El acoso de las fantasias, Slavoj Zizek indicates that “given the temporal 
circuit, the phantasmatic narration always incorporates an impossible viewpoint, 
the viewpoint through which the subject is already present in the act of his own 
conception” (23-24). 
22 Translating from the French, one psychoanalytic tradition alludes to fantasy by 
the term “fantasm.” In his excellent article about trauma and the time of the 
subjectivity, Francesc Roca indicates that “An experience lived as traumatic by 
placing the subject face to face with his lack of being, can only enter into discourse 
by means of the fantasm with which the subject speaks to himself” (80). 
318 Chapter Fourteen  
 
enunciate this nucleus by means of a fantasy allowing him to find himself 
present as subject (with the ability to articulate the entire representation 
around him), merely confirms that only in this form could the paradoxical 
relation—of extimacy, psychoanalysis will call it—be exorcized: to turn 
the trauma into a strange, extraneous body, both lodged in and radically 
external to the subject.  
 
Translation from the Spanish by Colman Hogan and Marta Marín-Dòmine 
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